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Issues and Findings 
Discussed in this Research in 
Brief: How eight State and Federal 
prisons have dealt with riots and 
what strategies and procedures are 
effective during the stages of a 
prison riot. 
Key issues: Safety of prison em-
ployees, inmates, and residents of 
the area in which the facility is lo-
cated, plus the financial cost of 
prison riots makes their prevention 
and containment a critical issue. 
Factors that must be addressed in-
'Jde such criminal justice issues as 
, 10W prisons are administered (and 
how command is divided during ri-
ots), race relations in prisons, how 
prisons are built and renovated, 
how prisons are staffed, and how 
staff are utilized and augmented 
during riots. 
Findings: On the basis of an 
indepth examination of eight dis-
turbances, the study concluded 
that proactive planning and prepa-
ration along with reactive problem 
solving is the most effective ap-
proach to prison riot resolution. A 
prison's riot plan should include: 
• A command structure with well-
defined lines of authority. 
e Clear guidelines on the use of 
force, including staff and weapons 
assignments. 
e Interagency cooperation terms 
·'"tat specify the roles of such units 
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Resolution of Prison Riots 
by Bert Useem, Camille Graham Camp, George M. Camp, and Renie Dugan 
Because prison riots have occurred all 
too often, they can be anticipated in 
the future. An indepth study sponsored 
by the National Institute of Justice and 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 
examined eight disturbances to under-
stand how prison riots have been re" 
solved and to consider strategies to 
prepare for, settle, and recover from 
them more effectively at the lowest 
cost to all parties. Roadblocks to the 
successful resolution of prison riots 
often stem from the same misunder-
standings and miscommunications ex-
perienced in ordinary life, multiplied by 
the pressures of the event. Successful 
resolutions require a controlled, mea-
sured response: an orderly command 
post, clear lines of authority, effective 
communication, appreciation of the 
consequences of alternative lines of 
action, and a sense among corrections 
staff that their skills and training are 
adequate to the challenge at hand. 
This Research in Brief highlights what 
was learned from prison administrators 
and from reports, interviews, and his-
torical data from the eight incidents. A 
brief description of each event is fol-
lowed by a discussion of strategies and 
procedures to use during the three 
phases of a prison riot: before, during, 
and after. 1 
The incidents 
Kirkland Correctional Institution 
(Kirkland)--South Carolina. The 
Kirkland facility was generally well man-
aged at the time of the disturbance of April 
I, 1986, and so was the riot's resolution. 
The riot began in a housing unit holding 
the prison's most violent and disruptive in-
mates. Inmates seized control of this unit, 
scaled the fence around it, and then used 
construction tools left on the grounds to re-
lease 700 general-population inmates. The 
riot command post functioned smoothly, 
resolving the disturbance in 6 hours. 
U.S. Penitentiary (Atlanta)--Georgia. On 
November 10, 1987, the U.S. State Depart-
ment announced that Cuba had agreed to 
reinstate a 1984 accord that would permit 
the repatriation of up to 2,500 Cuban na-
tionals. Included would be Cubans who 
had fled in the 1980 Mariel boatlift but 
who, once released on "immigration pa-
role," had been convicted of a crime and 
were now detained in one of two Federal 
prisons. Three days after the announce-
ment, the detainees seized control of the 
U.S. Penitentiary in Atlanta (part of the 
Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice). Their principal demand was that they 
not be repatriated to Cuba. The uprising 
lasted 11 days, involved more than 100 
hostages, and required protracted negotia-
tions to resolve. 
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as the State Police and the local fire 
department. 
e Training programs that address 
tactical strategies and mental readi-
ness for emergencies. 
Strategies to prevent and deal with 
riots must address many factors, 
including: 
e Maintaining supervision of an ex-
perienced staff who follow sound se-
curity practices. 
e Ensuring the security of the physi-
cal plant and equipment. 
e Discerning the signs of a probable 
riot from false clues and relaying reli-
able information up the chain of 
command. 
e Selecting the most appropriate 
means of resolving a riot: use of 
force, negotiations, or a combination 
of tactics. 
e Using strategies that range from 
immediate use of force to waiting 
until inmate leaders are ready to 
negotiate. 
e Addressing issues of staff morale 
and emotional support after a riot 
ends. 
e Incorporating the lessons learned 
from experiences with disturbances 
into revised riot plans. 
Target Audience: Prison administra-
tors, State and local policymakers, 
law enforcement practitioners. 
Mack Alford Correctional Center (Mack 
Alford)-Oklahoma_ The riot that oc-
curred at this medium-security institu-
tion between May 13 and 15, 1988, was 
preceded by a 6-hour period during 
which black and white inmates milled 
about in crowds, expressing antagonism 
toward each other and toward authori-
ties. Despite attempts to defuse the situ-
ation, a corrections official was taken 
hostage late in the evening, marking the 
start of the riot. Over a 2-hour period, in-
mates seized seven more hostages and 
took over two-thirds of the prison. No 
substantive issues were raised during the 
3-day disturbance, which was eventually 
resolved through a combination of nego-
tiation, exhaustion on the part of the in-
mates, and defection by inmates who no 
longer wanted to participate. 
Coxsackie Correctional Facility (Cox-
sackie)-New York. Coxsackie houses 
primarily maximum-security inmates; 
the institution's Special Housing Unit 
(SHU) is for inmates segregated from the 
others to serve disciplinary terms for se-
rious violations of the rules. For approxi-
mately 14 hours, on August 1 and 2, 
1988, 32 SHU inmates held several of-
ficers hostage and destroyed much of the 
SHU facility. The riot began when an in-
mate assaulted an officer in the exercise 
yard; the five officers working in the 
SHU that day were not regularly as-
signed to this unit, so they were not as 
familiar with procedures as those who 
worked there routinely. Stafffrom the fa-
cility and the central office established 
communications with the inmates almost 
immediately after the SHU was over-
taken and remained in contact during 
the time it took negotiators to bring 
about resolution. 
Idaho State Correctional Institution 
(ISCI). ISCI houses medium-custody in-
mates as well as close-custody inmates 
(those who are dangerous and difficult to 
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manage), inmates in administrative seg-
regation and detention, and those await-
ing execution. On September 28, 1988, 
inmates in a close-custody housing unit 
refused to return to their cells after hav-
ing been observed drinking a home-
made alcoholic beverage. They then 
used an unsecured table to break into 
the unit's control center. The riot was 
eventually brought under control by an 
ultimatum and riot squad deployment. 
Pennsylvania State Correctional Insti-
tution at Camp Hill (Camp Hill)- Since 
1975 Camp Hill had been an adult cor-
rectional facility, housing minimum- and 
medium-security inmates. On October 
25, 1989, inmates returning from an ex-
ercise yard in the late afternoon over-
whelmed correctional staff and seized 
eight hostages. The riot ended through 
negotiations, and inmates were confined 
to cells. The next day the superintendent 
met with the inmates to discuss their 
grievances. In a development unknown 
to him, many of the cells to which the in-
mates had been confined were not se-
cure, permitting the start of a second riot 
later that same day. Five more hostages 
were taken. Negotiations were again at-
tempted, but the riot finally ended when 
State police forcibly entered the 
compound. 
Arizona State Prison Complex 
(Cimarron) Cimarron Unit. This one-
hour disturbance by inmates at the 
Cimarron Unit of the Arizona State 
Prison Complex at Tucson initially pitted 
inmates against inmates. It began as a 
fight over a cigarette lighter and esca-
lated into a large, racially divided brawl. 
When prison administrators intervened, 
inmates turned on them, and force had to 
be used to end the disturbance. 
Federal Correctional Institution 
(Talladega )-Alabama. Changes 
prompted by the 1987 Cuban detainee 
••• Research in Brief I 
riots at the U.S. Penitentiary in At-
lanta, Georgia, and at the Federal De-
tention Center in Oakdale, Louisiana, 
were put to the test 4 years later when 
Cuban detainees rioted at Talladega 
between August 21 and 30, 1991. Af-
ter hostages had been held for lO days, 
prison administrators concluded that 
their health and safety were at increas-
ing risk and prospects for a negotiated 
settlement were dim. A carefully 
planned and rehearsed assault, maxi-
mizing the element of surprise, ended 
the incident without serious injuries to 
the hostages or detainees. 
Procedures and strategies: 
before the riot 
All prison administrators make efforts 
to avoid disturbances but also prepare 
for their occurrence. In the riots stud-
ied, various planning and avoidance 
measures were used with varying de-
grees of success. 
Riot preparation includes the acquisi-
tion of resources (organization, equip-
ment, and information) for use in a riot 
situation, the development of a strat-
egy for the use of these resources, and 
the mental readiness to respond to an 
incident. The importance of advance 
preparation in all its manifestations 
cannot be overstated. Three elements 
are especially important: command, 
planning, and training. 
Riot preparation: issues of 
command 
Crucial to the resolution of any riot is 
command-the ability to exercise au-
thority and direction over the forces 
and resources available. This encom-
passes the capacity to deploy the 
forces at hand, monitor their actions in 
the field on a continuous basis, deliver 
orders promptly and effectively, coor-
dinate operations with other State and 
Who Should Take Command in a Prison Riot? 
he level of command during a 
prison riot depends on several factors: 
• Knowledge of the facility. 
• Effects on the chain of command. 
• Breadth of experience, responsibility, 
and communication. 
• Links between responsibility and 
authority. 
• The administrative framework. 
Some of these factors favor assigning 
command to the warden, but others in-
dicate the central office administrator or 
the commissioner may be more appro-
priate in particular situations. 
The warden 
Because details vary from one facility to 
the next, one unit to the next, and one 
shift to the next, some agencies feel that 
overall authority should remain in the 
hands of the warden, who has greater 
overall knowledge of the facility. This 
knowledge may enable him or her to 
more quickly assess the situation and 
recognize the consequences of different 
courses of action. 
To many corrections administrators, an-
other compelling argument for keeping 
riot resolution in the hands of the war-
den concerns maintaining the chain of 
command in the aftermath. Taking away 
the warden's authority during a distur-
bance, it is argued, may undermine his 
or her subsequent authority; midlevel 
managers, correctional officers, and in-
mates alike will view the central office, 
not the warden, as the real authority. 
Allowing the warden to remain in com-
mand for the riot's duration reaffirms 
~ I. 
the commitment of the central office to 
his or her leadership. 
However, if the warden is new, someone 
else who has spent more time at the fa-
cility (a central office administrator, for 
example) may be more familiar with it. 
Each situation must be weighed individu-
ally. In some cases, a team approach may 
be warranted to capitalize on the knowl-
edge and skill of each individual. 
Central office administrator 
Because of their experience across a 
range of situations, central office admin-
istrators may have a more developed un-
derstanding of resolution strategies. They 
are more likely, as well, to have greater 
insight into the effects of disturbances on 
the department or corrections as a whole 
than those whose primary identification 
may be with a particular facility. Addi-
tionally, their experiences in dealing with 
agencies and resources outside the de-
partment can be brought to bear, if 
necessary. 
The commissioner 
In other cases, it is argued that because 
the commissioner bears ultimate respon-
sibility for the resolution, decision making 
authority should reside in his or her 
hands. Moreover, in agencies in which 
the decision making power tends to be 
concentrated in the central office, exist-
ing practice may dictate that the com-
missioner take direct charge of the 
resolution. The commissioner can follow 
the procedures he or she and others in 
the central office have established. By 
contrast, in decentralized departments in 
which wardens have greater latitude, it 
may be more advantageous for the war-
den to remain in command. 
••• Research in Brief • •• 
Federal agencies, and gather and in-
terpret information on what inmates 
are doing and intend to do. The longer 
a riot lasts, the more agencies that he-
come involved, and the larger the area 
and the number of hostages held by in-
mates, the more complex command he-
comes. The challenge is met, in part, 
through achieving unity of command 
and determining the necessary level 
and location of command. 
Unity of command. Unity of command 
refers to the principle that members of 
an organization are accountable to a 
single superior vested with the requi-
site authority to coordinate personnel 
efforts to achieve common objectives. 
In its absence, coordination may still 
he achieved through voluntary mutual 
cooperation, but this may break down 
if disagreements arise. 
Unity of command was not fully 
achieved at Camp Hill. Although the 
State Police had traditionally assumed 
control over the resolution of Pennsyl-
vania prison riots, the division of au-
thority between the State Police and 
the Corrections Department had not 
been clearly delineated before the in-
cident. During the disturbance, ten-
sion developed between the two 
agencies, and issues that should have 
been settled before the disturbance 
(such as the particular type of ammu-
nition that the State Police would 
carry) had to he resolved on the spot, 
taking up precious time. Since the riot, 
great strides have been taken to estab-
lish a firmer working relationship 
among State agencies. 
Unity of command can he impaired by 
divisions among command personnel. 
Although one individual is formally in 
charge, command is almost always a 
team effort. One task in riot prepara-
tion is to forge a team and develop 
trust among its members. In the riots 
studied this was achieved to varying 
degrees. At Kirkland, the command 
group evidenced a strong level of trust 
within the group. Members supported 
each other and allowed open expres-
sion of views and impartial exploration 
of options. As a result, the command 
team could focus on the task at hand 
and act decisively. 
Level and location of command. Di-
rectly related to unity of command is 
level of command (which official in the 
correctional hierarchy will be in 
charge) and location of command 
(where the key command post will be 
established). With regard to level of 
command, decisionmaking authority 
may reside in the prison, usually with 
the warden, or within the agency's 
larger administrative framework, with 
either a regional or agency director. 
(See "Who Should Take Command in 
a Prison Riot?") Additionally, a prison 
riot is the sort of public emergency in 
which higher officials may feel the need 
to step in and exercise command 
themselves. 
With regard to location of command, 
offsite decisionmakers may choose to 
go to the facility or may choose to re-
main offsite, either in their administra-
tive offices or a preestablished 
emergency operations center. 
Location and level of command should 
he determined as part of overall emer-
gency planning. Arguing in favor of lo-
cal control, both in level and location, 
is the need for the commander to 
readily size up the situation. This re-
quires knowing the layout of the facil-
ity, the obstacles that might be 
encountered in an assault, the back-
grounds of the inmates involved, the 
multitude of standing orders, and the 
capabilities of onsite staff. 
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In instances in which it is decided that 
authority for the resolution of the riot 
resides outside the prison, an addi-
tional decision must be made regard-
ing where to situate the command post. 
Some of the same advantages of local 
command may be gained by situating 
the command post at the facility itself. 
On the other hand, it takes time to es-
tablish and staff a command post in 
the field, and the resources (for ex-
ample, communication networks and 
office equipment), if mobilized rapidly, 
may be inadequate. If decisionmakers 
operate from an existing offsite facility, 
the amount of time and effort needed 
to establish the field command post 
may be focused on the incident itself. 
At both Coxsackie and ISCI, the com-
missioner took direct control of the 
resolution of the riots. Significant deci-
sions were deferred (to the extent fea-
sible) until the commissioner arrived 
on the scene. The commissioner be-
came, in effect, both the final authority 
and the field commander. At Mack 
Alford, the warden was given the pri-
mary responsibility for designing and 
executing the resolution. The commis-
sioner saw his role as establishing a 
framework to assist the warden. He 
served as a sounding board for the war-
den, providing advice and direction; he 
met with State political leaders to assure 
them that all that could be done was be-
ing done, thus insulating the warden 
from political pressure; and he mobi-
lized resources to put at the warden's 
disposal. The commissioner allowed the 
warden to make key decisions so long as 
he continued to have confidence in the 
warden's performance. 
Kirkland, Atlanta, Talladega, and 
Camp Hill each represents a somewhat 
different approach. At Kirkland the 
commissioner and members of his 
executive staff met with the warden . 
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Although it was clear that the commis-
sioner was the ultimate authority, the 
group functioned more like an execu-
tive committee working jointly to de-
velop a solution. Command was 
somewhat fluid, allowing discussion 
of the options based on their merits. 
At Atlanta both the Federal Regional 
Director and the warden were at the 
prison soon after the riot began. It was 
decided to give local authority to the 
Regional Director, but because of the 
duration of the riot, it was necessary to 
develop teams to rotate in and out of 
leadership positions. In Washington, 
the Attorney General and the Director 
of the BOP maintained direct oversight 
of the resolution. 
At Camp Hill, the commissioner took 
the position that responsibility for the 
riot's resolution rested with the super-
intendent. In practice, however, he 
involved himself in a number of 
important decisions that resulted in 
some fracturing of command. 
Riot preparation: planning 
A riot plan should be a comprehensive 
guide that describes the special re-
sponsibilities to be met, the resources 
to be used, and the contribution of 
each individual or group involved. It 
should embody the correctional 
agency's principles and strategies for 
resolution. 
Riot plans are too often a weakly inte-
grated compendium of policy state-
ments, advice, memos, and agreements 
among agencies. Cumbersome plans 
are likely to receive lip service but be 
ignored during a disturbance. Plans 
should be well-organized, clearly writ-
ten, and concise. They should include 
procedures for how the riot plan book 
is to be used during an incident; the 
book itself is often left behind in the 
heat of the moment. Guidelines for de-
veloping a riot plan, produced as part 
of this study, are highlighted on the 
following pages. 
Use-of-force guidelines. A critical el-
ement of emergency planning is a use-
of-force policy. Which staff members 
are authorized to order the use of 
force? What responses are appropriate 
in various situations? What weapons 
and less-than-lethal munitions (e.g, 
tear gas) are appropriate for use in 
specific situations? These policies 
should be based on both sound correc-
tional practices and evolving law on 
the use of force to quell prison riots. 
Interagency cooperation. In the event 
that the assistance of other agencies is 
required (for medical care, additional 
security forces, or investigative teams, 
for example), the riot plan should in-
clude contact names and telephone 
numbers and an outline of existing 
agreements between agencies. These 
would have been useful at Camp Hill 
to clarify the roles and responsibilities 
of the State Police and at Idaho, where 
a municipal fire company hesitated in 
responding to a call for help. 
Riot preparation: training 
Although planning can be conducted 
in an agency's central office for the 
agency as a whole or in the warden's 
office for a particular facility, mental 
readiness can be achieved only 
through field practice and instruction. 
The South Carolina Department of 
Corrections has developed a rigorous 
training program for its wardens, 
deputy wardens, and other senior 
prison managers. An annual 3-day 
training seminar combines classroom 
instruction with field practice to en-
sure readiness to handle emergencies. 
In addition, demanding, unannounced 
onsite riot scenarios are conducted in 
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South Carolina facilities. Participants 
later write up their experiences and of-
fer recommendations for improving the 
department's emergency procedures. 
These training efforts had observable 
payoffs in the incidents examined in 
this study. 
In training it is important to ensure 
that different components of the re-
sponse team will work to assist one an-
other. Exercises should integrate the 
activities of command, hostage nego-
tiation teams, and tactical teams; oth-
erwise these components will be 
unfamiliar with the operation of the 
others. If a riot plan calls for the assis-
tance of State Police or other agencies, 
much can be gained from joint training 
with those agencies. 
Riot avoidance 
Some riots come as a complete sur-
prise; others flow rather directly from a 
snowballing set of events in which the 
forces of disorder gain momentum. 
Still others take place in situations 
known to be unusually dangerous and 
with a significant degree of warning. 
These three configurations present dif-
ferent opportunities for riot avoidance. 
Riots with no warning. The riots at 
Talladega, Kirkland, Coxsackie, and 
ISCI occurred without significant 
warning. All but the ISCI riot occurred 
in high-security units. The ISCI riot 
began in a unit that had been con-
structed as medium-security housing, 
but the inmates housed there were 
classified as close-custody (more dan-
gerous and difficult to manage than the 
medium-security inmates). 
In units where violent and rebellious 
inmates are concentrated, prison 
administrators rely in large part on the 
physical elements of security to pre-
vent violence. When riots do occur, 
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they are primarily a function of oppor-
tunity; that is, they take place when 
one or several inmates are able to ini-
tiate a disturbance by taking advan-
tage of a weakness in or a momentary 
lapse of the security system and are 
subsequently able to spread the distur-
bance by defeating other security sys-
tems. While no system is absolutely 
foolproof, riot avoidance can be 
achieved through a combination of con-
stant vigilance and physical control. 
• Experienced staff and supervision. In 
a high-security unit, the continuous 
presence of experienced staff, both 
line officers and supervisors, is a 
sound security practice. This was not 
fully achieved at Coxsackie, where the 
officers regularly assigned to the high-
security Special Housing Unit were 
absent on the day of the disturbance. 
The replacement officers were not as 
familiar with the unit's procedures. 
Moreover, responsibility for supervis-
ing the unit, normally vested in a ser-
geant assigned full time to the unit, 
had been temporarily transferred to a 
sergeant whose regular assignment was 
elsewhere in the facility. One of the 
postriot procedural changes was to re-
quire that a sergeant be present in the 
unit at all times. Relief officers were 
also given more thorough orientation to 
SHU procedures. 
• Post orders. All post orders, espe-
cially for posts in restricted units, 
should anticipate the possibility of an 
incident. At ISCI, correctional admin-
istrators removed an inmate from a 
unit while other inmates in the same 
unit were not confined to their cells. 
Had the post orders required that all 
inmates be in their cells before an 
inmate was removed, the rebellion 
could not have developed. At Kirk-
land's Unit D, the post orders did not 
specify the keys the evening duty 
officer should and should not carry 
when entering the unit. The keys to the 
cell doors were not needed when en-
tering the unit, but the officer first 
taken hostage was carrying them, and 
this permitted the incident to expand. 
• Physical plant and equipment. Physi-
cal plant weaknesses allowed distur-
bances at some of the institutions to 
spread. At Coxsackie, the wire-rein-
forced glass surrounding the control 
center was easily broken by inmates. 
Funds that had been requested for re-
placing the glass had not yet been ap-
proved. At Talladega the line of vision 
to the small recreation yard where in-
mates first gained control was ob-
scured by an electrical transformer. 
ISCI's dayroom contained heavy furni-
ture that inmates used to break into 
the control room. 
Escalation of existing conflict. The 
disturbances at Mack Alford Correc-
tional Center and the Cimarron Unit of 
the Arizona State Prison at Tucson 
both resulted from escalating events. 
The events leading to the two riots fol-
lowed a common pattern. First, on the 
day of the disturbances a dispute 
among inmates inflamed preexisting 
intergroup tensions. Second, the con-
flicts gained momentum because of a 
series of retaliatory moves. Third, op-
posing groups of inmates mobilized, 
leading to the confrontation. 
The two riots actually began when staff 
intervened and inmates redirected 
their hostility against them. At Mack 
Alford this occurred when an officer 
without backup pursued an inmate 
who resisted his transfer to another 
prison. The inmate took the officer 
hostage; shortly thereafter, other in-
mates joined the disturbance, seizing 
additional hostages and territory. At 
Cimarron the riot began when a fight 
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between two inmates broke out along 
racial lines in the chow line and then 
turned into a brawl in the cafeteria be-
fore spilling into the yard. 
Riot avoidance in these situations lies 
in managing the stages of escalation. 
At Mack Alford the administration 
had, over a 6-hour period, skillfully 
managed a potentially explosive situa-
tion (made more difficult by a shortage 
of detention cells). Only late in the 
process was an officer taken hostage. 
At Cimarron, once the conflict had 
reached the intensity of a brawl in the 
cafeteria, there was little opportunity 
to reverse the process because the of-
ficers on the scene were quickly 
overwhelmed. 
Riots with warning. It is common for 
facility administrators to hear rumors 
and predictions of riots. Of course, 
from time to time the warnings are 
genuine. Often, however, such rumors 
are exaggeration or hearsay. They may 
even be deliberate attempts to create a 
crisis, either for its own sake or to 
force change. 
How may prison administrators recog-
nize a facility that is truly on the brink 
of a disturbance? The American Cor-
rectional Association identifies 27 
"indicators of prison tension that often 
precede riots and disturbances."2 
They include an increase in disciplin-
ary hearings, warnings by inmates to 
officers that they should take vacation 
or sick leave, and an increase in 
employee turnover. 
Yet no such list is infallible. The pres-
ence of "traditional indicators" might 
well signal danger, but their absence 
does not necessarily ensure safety-
not in the face of other "nontradi-
tional" evidence, nor in a situation in 
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which tensions are known to be high. 
Moreover, evidence obtained from 
within the prison needs to be com-
bined with an understanding of what 
kinds of situations or grievances are 
likely to produce riots. 
The events leading up to the start of 
the riot at the U.S. Penitentiary at At-
lanta on November 23, 1987, illustrate 
the difficulties of distinguishing valid 
warnings from false ones. During the 
2-day period immediately preceding 
the Atlanta riot, there was evidence 
that a riot might be impending. De-
tainees in one unit had remained 
dressed overnight, the volume of out-
going mail was reported to be several 
times heavier than normal, and much 
of it contained photographs.3 In retro-
spect it appears that inmates were 
mailing these photographs to avoid 
their being lost or destroyed in the 
riot. 4 At the time, the increased vol-
ume was explained as the result of a 
new program allowing detainees to 
have pictures taken of themselves. 
However, the staff had observed de-
tainees removing their family photo-
graphs from their lockers. 
The Atlanta officials were mindful of 
the possibility of a riot. The warden 
met several times with his executive 
staff and department heads to deter-
mine whether a lockdown was war-
ranted. Still, the evidence they had 
obtained was never quite sufficient.5 
Thus, in some contexts, warnings re-
ally do predict riots; in others, they 
may be discounted. Warning signs 
should be the starting point of an in-
vestigation, not the basis on which 
conclusions are drawn and policy is 
formulated. Questions such as these 
should be asked and answered in de-
tail: Is the source of information reli-
able? Are such warnings out of the 
ordinary? Are predictions of trouble 
widely shared or are they held by only 
a few? Do the signs indicate serious 
unrest among inmates or merely rou-
tine grumbling? Administrators are 
much better prepared to interpret the 
answers to these questions if they 
know their institutions and inmate 
populations thoroughly. 
During the riot 
Prison administrators have three main 
options to attempt to bring about reso-
lution. They may forcibly retake the 
prison (the tactical solution), they may 
end the riot through talking (the nego-
tiation solution), or they may let the 
Responses to Riot Warnings 
f there appears to be a high prob-
ability that a riot is imminent, administra-
tors may take administrative or diplomatic 
actions to prevent it. 
Administrative actions include a lockdown 
of a unit or the entire facility; transfer of 
suspected instigators to a segregated unit 
or another facility; cancellation of activities 
that give inmates the opportunity to con-
gregate, such as recreation or work; an in-
creased presence of correctional officers 
who, by posture and words, convey that 
they will not permit a disturbance; and a 
search for contraband. 
Diplomatic actions include efforts to con-
vince inmates that a riot would be costly to 
them personally, counterproductive to re-
form, or unnecessary because their griev-
ances will be addressed in the future. 
Administrative and diplomatic actions can 
be used in combination. Potential instiga-
tors may be removed from prisons and the 
issues around which they are mobilizing 
resolved. Sometimes, however, strategies 
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riot die of its own accord (the waiting 
solution). 
In actual riots, such as those studied, 
the boundaries between these strate-
gies may become indistinct. Negotia-
tions can be used to collect information 
for a tactical assault or to tire and de-
moralize the inmates so they will sur-
render. A waiting policy can be used 
to strengthen the administration's tac-
tical capabilities or, if used in con-
junction with deprivation of food, 
water, or electricity, to force inmates to 
bargain seriously. A visible tactical 
mobilization may permit inmates to 
see more clearly the consequences of 
failed negotiations or it may wear them 
conflict. At Atlanta, administrators felt 
themselves forced to choose between a 
primarily administrative strategy and a pri-
marily diplomatic strategy. They reasoned 
that a lockdown could not be counted on 
to be effective. Some detainees were 
housed in dormitory units that could not 
be locked down, and the cell doors in the 
administrative segregation section were 
old and possibly defective. At the same 
time, a lockdown might further inflame 
already angry detainees and precipitate 
"the very riot a lockdown [was) intended 
to prevent. "25 Had the BOP had the 
names of the inmates who were slated 
for deportation, it could have locked 
down those inmates in secure cells and 
used its skills in persuasion to convince 
others not to start trouble. This informa-
tion, however, was not available. Forced 
to choose between the two strategies, 
the administration selected a primarily 
diplomatic approach. 
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down. Still, at any given time prison 
administrators must commit themselves 
to one course or another based on the 
costs and benefits of each option. 
Tactical solutions: the use of 
force 
In general, a riot can be terminated at 
any time by using overwhelming force. 
Nevertheless, such a deployment of 
force can be costly. (This is one of the 
lessons of the 1971 Attica riot that re-
tains its force today. In the assault at 
Attica, 39 people died.) As a conse-
quence, commanders must develop 
strategies to minimize the risks to hos-
tages, assault forces, and inmates, as 
well as to ensure that the assault force 
is invulnerable. Such strategies de-
pend upon the type of force used. 
Three types of force were observed in 
the riots under study. 
Immediate force. Force may be used 
as a first response to a disturbance. 
Armed personnel may be rushed in to 
defend or retake specific areas without 
waiting for the riot to expand to its po-
tential territorial limit. The key ele-
ment in achieving the desired result is 
the speed with which sufficient num-
bers of staff can be mobilized, 
equipped, and organized. 
There are advantages to the early use 
of force. As noted above, riots may be-
gin without plan or organization. The 
immediate use of force may prevent in-
mates from becoming organized, from 
fashioning weapons, from fortifying 
their position, and from recruiting ad-
ditional participants and expanding 
the territorial limits of the riot. It will 
also limit the pain and suffering of the 
hostages already taken. 
Moreover, force used immediately may 
deny inmates the opportunity to prom-
ise to themselves and to the authorities 
that they will harm the hostages unless 
their demands are met. Once such 
threats are made, inmates may find it 
psychologically difficult to back down 
from them. The Atlanta detainees, for 
example, consistently promised to kill 
hostages if an assault were made. Even 
though they may have realized the dire 
consequences of such acts, their pub-
lic commitment to this course of action 
might have psychologically obligated 
them to make good on it. One of the 
disadvantages of negotiations, com-
pared to the early use of force, is that 
inmates are given an opportunity to 
make threats to which they then may 
become committed. 
The greatest challenge in the early use 
of force is assembling the necessary 
personnel and equipment with suffi-
cient speed. A riot control squad de-
ployed too quickly runs the risk of 
being overrun and taken hostage. The 
tension between the opportunities pre-
sented by and dangers posed by early 
use of force grew to extraordinary pro-
portions at Kirkland. In the riot's 
opening stages, correctional officers in 
a housing unit reported to the control 
center that armed inmates were break-
ing into the unit, which was filling with 
smoke. Officers were arriving at the fa-
cility, but their numbers were insuffi-
cient to deploy a squad to rescue the 
trapped officers. When the number 
reached 35 (command had wanted at 
least 100), an assault force was dis-
patched to rescue the trapped officers. 
Once this was achieved, momentum 
was behind the riot squad and they be-
gan to clear the yard of inmates. 
By contrast, at Coxsackie, prison ad-
ministrators had a compelling reason 
to use force immediately because in-
mates were observed assaulting cor-
rectional officers. However, the SHU's 
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high-security design impeded quick 
access. Therefore, no immediate action 
was taken because the inmates threat-
ened to kill the hostages if authorities 
tried to use force to resolve the situa-
tion, and officials could not have pre-
vented this. 
Planned tactical strike. The essence 
of the tactical strike is to maximize the 
element of surprise. Administrators 
deploy staff in an attempt to release 
hostages or retake the facility before 
inmates can react. The assault at 
Talladega was this type. Its key ele-
ments were: 
• Intelligence. There was a continuous 
effort to gather intelligence. Released 
hostages were debriefed, and the infor-
mation obtained from them was used to 
assess the inmates' leadership and the 
location of hostages. 
• Drills and rehearsals. Rehearsals 
were conducted that accurately simu-
lated the planned mission. This was 
accomplished by conducting drills in a 
nearby housing unit that was similar in 
construction to the one being held by 
inmates. 
• Timing. The assault was timed to oc-
cur when there was a maximum oppor-
tunity of success-in the predawn 
hours when inmates were asleep or 
generally more subdued. The team's 
entry was made under cover of night. 
• Unity of command. The assault 
force's command unity was at its maxi-
mum level. One assault force (the 
FBI's Hostage Rescue Team) assumed 
sole responsibility for regaining the 
building. Other tactical teams from the 
FBI and BOP were used in support 
roles. 
• Weaponry. Arsenal weapons were 
used to further diminish the capacity 
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of inmates to react. Stun grenades con-
fused and disoriented the detainees. 
• Speed. The attack was executed with 
great speed. Explosives were used to 
breach the entry doors quickly with 
minimal injury to those inside. Using 
the intelligence that had been gath-
ered, the hostages were quickly lo-
cated and freed. 
• Surprise. No warnings or ultimatums 
were issued to the inmates. A meal 
was served to the inmates to foster 
their feelings of success in negotia-
tions and to lower their vigilance. 
The disadvantages of using a tactical 
strike to resolve a hostage situation are 
twofold. First, it might be unnecessary 
because negotiations may resolve the 
incident. Even if they do not, inmates 
given a choice between surrender and 
having force used against them may 
choose the former. The problem is that 
they cannot make that choice unless it 
is offered to them, either implicitly or 
explicitly. The purpose of an ultima-
tum is make the warning explicit. 
Second, material conditions and the 
vigilance of inmates may make a tacti-
cal strike too risky. If inmates hold a 
large number of hostages, disperse 
them, and threaten to harm them in the 
event of an assault, as the Atlanta de-
tainees did with more than 100 hos-
tages, it may not be possible to 
overcome their tactical advantage. An 
assault under those conditions, how-
ever well-executed, would be perilous 
at best. 
Riot squad formations. A third type of 
force is akin to that used by police to 
quell an ongoing urban riot. Riot 
squads move in unified groups to force 
clusters of inmates to move in one di-
rection or to disperse. The essence of 
this type of force is reliance on the 
size, discipline, and firepower of the 
assembled force to overwhelm inmates 
and make them back down. Unlike a 
tactical strike, in which an assault 
force's presence is concealed as long 
as possible, a riot squad's presence is 
deliberately established. Batons and 
shotguns may be carried not only as 
weapons, but also to convince inmates 
that resistance is futile.6 
The general strategy is to establish a 
cordon around the riot area, using ex-
isting geographic breaks (e.g., build-
ings, exterior or interior fences) where 
possible. The purpose of the cordon is 
to prevent the riot from expanding in 
area and to prevent other inmates from 
joining the riot. Once sufficient forces 
are in place, the cordoned area is par-
titioned into smaller zones, which are 
then retaken one after another. The 
riot ends when the last zone is se-
cured. The force used to end the sec-
ond riot at Camp Hill was primarily a 
riot squad movement. The Cimarron 
riot ended through the use of a riot 
squad, and at Kirkland a riot squad 
was deployed to ensure that the sur-
render of inmates was orderly. 
Negotiations 
In a prison riot the term "negotiation" 
refers to a dialog between inmates and 
authorities that focuses on achieving 
an end to the incident. Four of the ri-
ots under study ended through nego-
tiations: Camp Hill (the first riot), 
Atlanta, Mack Alford, and Coxsackie. 
Negotiations were also conducted at 
Talladega and (very briefly) at Kirkland 
but later abandoned in favor of other ap-
proaches. The negotiations observed can 
be divided into three types. 
Negotiation as bargaining. The dialog 
between inmates and prison authori-
ties may be primarily an exercise in 
bargaining. Inmates believe they have 
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put themselves in a position to bargain 
with the State. They may see their hos-
tages and the portion of the facility 
they occupy as "chips"; they want to 
trade those chips for publicity, am-
nesty, improved conditions, or other 
benefits. The government may respond 
to inmates' demands with counter-de-
mands. The resolution comes when the 
right bargain is struck. At Atlanta, this 
was the release of the hostages in re-
turn for a new review process and a 
promise not to prosecute. At Camp 
Hill (the first riot), inmates released 
the hostages after the superintendent 
promised to meet with them the next 
day to discuss their grievances and to 
issue a press release announcing that 
meeting. 
Negotiation as problem solving. 
Inmates may take territory or hostages 
simply because they can. In those situ-
ations, negotiations become a dialog 
aimed less at bargaining and more at 
solving actual and perceived problems 
posed by the situation and the indi-
viduals involved. 
Inmate leaders in the Coxsackie riot 
issued personal demands that seemed 
disproportionate to the disturbances 
they created. The main instigator's 
principal demand was to speak over 
the phone to his stepfather. Appar-
ently, none of the other inmate partici-
pants challenged his pursuit of the 
issue. Inmates also sought assurances 
that staff would not retaliate for the 
beatings they inflicted on their hos-
tages or for the riot itself. 
Over the years, law enforcement hos-
tage negotiators have learned that it 
is usually best to respond as if the 
hostage holder's demands are authen-
tic, however odd or seemingly discon-
nected from the situation, and never to 
dismiss them as triviaP At Coxsackie 
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these strictures were followed with 
success. Administrators arranged for 
the inmate leader to talk on the phone 
with his stepfather. An agency negotia-
tor spent much of his time trying to 
calm the inmates and reassure them 
that they would not be injured when 
they gave up. A videocamera was put 
in place to record the surrender. These 
concessions were sufficient to solve 
the problems and end the disturbance. 
Negotiations as situation management. 
State authorities may use negotiations 
primarily as a means to manage the 
situation. The measure of success is 
not whether an agreement is reached 
(either through bargaining or by meet-
ing inmates' personal needs), but 
whether other goals are achieved: sta-
bilizing the situation, obtaining infor-
mation about conditions in the unit, 
and/or lowering inmates' vigilance 
against an assault. 
At Talladega, negotiations aimed at 
bargaining reached a dead end after 
several days. After this, they became 
primarily an instrument to manage the 
situation. BOP and FBI negotiators 
tried to calm the detainees and thereby 
reduce the threat to the hostages. In 
the riot's final stages, negotiations 
were used primarily to support a tacti-
cal operation. They were used to ob-
tain information and try to render the 
inmates less vigilant. 
The distinction among negotiation as 
bargaining, as problem-solving, and as 
situation management should not be 
overdrawn. The first definition sees 
resolution as being achieved by bring-
ing together the interests of the agency 
and the inmates. The second views 
resolution as being achieved by meet-
ing the immediate needs (especially 
the emotional needs) of the inmates as 
they articulate them. The third sees 
negotiation as a means to stabilize the 
situation and, if necessary, to prepare 
for a tactical assault. Negotiations al-
ways involve all three components. 
The distinctions among them are a 
matter of emphasis.8 
Parties to negotiations 
In approaching negotiations, adminis-
trators may assume that they are pitted 
against a single, unified group of in-
mates when, in fact, there may be 
schisms among the inmates or no orga-
nization whatsoever. Over time, in-
mates may fuse into a coherent group; 
fractionate into competing groups; or 
dissolve into small, antagonistic 
"pockets. "9 
In many types of negotiations, such as 
labor-management bargaining, the dis-
tinctions between individuals at the 
negotiating table are relatively clear-
cut, with managers on one side and 
elected representatives of the work-
force on the other. Prison riots are 
more complicated, and identifying who 
should sit at the bargaining table is 
more difficult. 
Inmate negotiators. For progress in 
negotiations to occur, there must be an 
inmate or group of inmates with whom 
officials can talk with a measure of 
continuity. These negotiating inmates 
must be able to sway other inmates; 
otherwise an agreement to end a riot is 
of little value. At Mack Alford the in-
mates who initiated the disturbance 
continued to exercise control over the 
disturbance and negotiated with prison 
administrators. At Camp Hill (the first 
riot), a group of inmates also emerged 
as leaders with whom prison authori-
ties could negotiate. At Coxsackie one 
inmate took responsibility for negotia-
tions, but toward the end of the distur-
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bance he seemed to be losing control 
over the others. 
In the early stages of the Atlanta inci-
dent, no individual inmate or group 
emerged with whom officials could ne-
gotiate, although on the first day four 
inmates presented government nego-
tiators with a list of demands, claiming 
that they represented the rest. Soon, 
however, other inmates contacted gov-
ernment negotiators asserting their au-
thority. At that stage none of the 
groups seemed genuinely interested in 
reaching a settlement.10 This absence 
of leadership took government negotia-
tors by surprise. Eventually, a loose 
coalition of inmates formed and bar-
gained with government officials in 
good faith. By the 11th day of rioting, 
the coalition had gained sufficient lev-
erage among the rioters to effect the 
release of the hostages after signing 
the agreement. 
The problem of inmate leadership was 
more grave at Talladega. The detain-
ees argued among themselves from the 
beginning. Administrators attempted 
to create a leadership group among the 
detainees. In one instance they ac-
ceded to a demand made by a rela-
tively moderate detainee in the hope 
that he would gain stature in the eyes 
of the other detainees. However, a 
moderate leadership group never 
coalesced; the detainees and the ad-
ministration remained far apart on the 
1ssues. 
Agency negotiators. The theory be-
hind hostage negotiation teams is now 
well established. A small group of ad-
ministrators receives special training 
in hostage negotiations. They are cho-
sen carefully, on the basis of intelli-
gence, levelheadedness, verbal skills, 
ability to think on their feet, and over-
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.til appearance. Their job during a dis-
turbance is to negotiate a settlement 
through bargaining and problem 
solving. Those with command 
(decisionmaking) authority refrain 
from talking directly to inmates. 
The separation between commander 
and negotiators is said to have several 
advantages. The commander can make 
decisions under less stressful condi-
tions. Negotiators can stall for time by 
referring requests and demands to a 
higher authority. If negotiators become 
overinvolved in the process, begin to 
lose objectivity, or experience high 
levels of stress, command personnel 
can take corrective action. There may 
be information the negotiators should 
not have because they might inadvert-
ently reveal it (for example, that an as-
sault is imminent) but which the 
person in command knows. Addition-
lily, the division between command 
and negotiation may allow negotiators 
to develop greater rapport with hostage 
holders. The government negotiator 
can appear to the inmates to be taking 
their side in gaining concessions from 
command and so develop the inmates' 
goodwill. u 
This model was followed at both At-
lanta and Talladega. At Atlanta, sev-
eral hours after the riot began, a BOP 
lieutenant made the first contact with a 
detainee and arranged for a face-to-
face negotiation session. He was soon 
joined by FBI negotiators, who then 
assumed control over the negotiations 
for the duration of the event. At 
Talladega a counselor assigned to the 
unit made the initial contact with the 
detainees and started negotiations. 
Later that evening, he withdrew from 
the negotiations; and trained negotia-
tors from the prison, the FBI, and the 
BOP took over. 
Coxsackie and Mack Alford followed 
different sequences. At Coxsackie, the 
first conversations occurred between 
the inmates and the department's ne-
gotiators as well as the deputy superin-
tendent of the institution. About 5 
hours into the disturbance, the Assis-
tant Commissioner for the department 
began to talk to the inmates in re-
sponse to their demand that they speak 
to an official "from Albany"; that is, 
someone with authority from the cen-
tral office. From that point on, the As-
sistant Commissioner became the lead 
negotiator, although he worked closely 
with the department negotiator and the 
deputy superintendent. 
Third-Party Negotiators 
n some instances, bringing In an 
individual from outside the correctional 
agency may prove useful in negotiations. 
Third parties were used in negotiations at 
Atlanta, Mack Alford, and Talladega. 
They played several roles: 
• As initiators of conversations. At 
Mack Alford, two popular inmate leaders 
who were not participating in the riot 
were recruited during its opening stages 
to initiate conversation with the rioting 
inmates who (at that point) refused to 
talk to the administration. 
• As guarantors to a promise. At 
Mack Alford, three State legislators were 
present at the surrender to reassure in-
mates that they would not be mistreated 
by corrections staff. 
• As guarantors that an agreement is 
authentic and in the inmates' inter-
est. At Atlanta, Bishop Agustin Roman 
(auxiliary bishop of Miami) made an au-
diotape stating that he supported the 
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At Mack Alford, two trained depart-
ment negotiators were brought to the 
prison. After about an hour, however, 
the inmates broke off the dialog, 
claiming that the negotiators had lied 
to them. They then insisted that they 
would speak only with a particular 
captain, whom they trusted. The cap-
tain remained the chief negotiator 
throughout the disturbance. 
The Coxsackie and Mack Alford nego-
tiations, while successful, did not fol-
low the model. In both cases, however, 
important principles were preserved. 
Neither the assistant commissioner at 
Coxsackie nor the captain at Mack 
Alford exercised authority in the situa-
agreement. To overcome a last-minute 
snag in the negotiations, Bishop Roman 
assured the detainees that BOP personnel 
who signed the agreement had the au-
thority to make a binding commitment. 
• As mediators searching for middle 
ground. At Atlanta, a legal services attor-
ney worked to develop a solution that was 
acceptable to both sides. He raised sub-
stantive issues with BOP administrators, 
and they responded in a written memo 
clarifying the Bureau's position. At the 
same time, the attorney helped persuade 
the Cuban detainees to accept the agree-
ment without a clause declaring that de-
portations would cease. 
• As government bargaining chips. At 
Talladega, the BOP allowed a reporter to 
talk to the detainees and report their story 
in return for the release of a hostage. At 
Coxsackie, commanders allowed the in-
mates' leader to have a 2-minute tele-
phone conversation with his stepfather. 
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tion. Thus, the advantages that come 
with splitting the command and nego-
tiation functions were not forfeited. An 
additional advantage was the in-
creased credibility of the negotiators 
in the inmates' eyes. 
Third-party involvement. In some 
situations, the assistance of parties 
from outside the agency may advance 
the negotiation process. The purpose 
of third-party involvement must be 
kept clearly in mind by administrators, 
who must be certain they make the de-
cision to implement it on the basis of 
merit alone. Other criteria (such as 
the political prominence of the indiv-
idual volunteers) must not be factors in 
the decision. Third-party negotiators 
must be carefully screened and agree 
not to raise new issues or to act as ad-
vocates for inmates.12 
Cycles of negotiation 
Studies of negotiations in other do-
mains, especially labor-management 
bargaining, have found that they tend 
to follow a common cycle. Initially, 
both parties make exaggerated de-
mands. This is followed by a period of 
withdrawal and a return to negotiations 
with more moderate demands. When 
parties try to circumvent this ritual, 
negotiations tend to break down.13 
Even concessions made too early in 
the negotiation process can be coun-
terproductive because parties "need 
the opportunity to experience exhaus-
tion of their demands before they can 
be satisfied that they had drained what 
was there to be had. Premature move-
ment robs them of this experience."14 
This pattern seems to have been fol-
lowed at Atlanta. During the first sev-
eral days, government negotiators 
perceived the detainees were not inter-
ested in making progress in the nego-
tiations. The detainees used 
negotiation sessions as an "opportunity 
to express their longstanding frustra-
tions"15 rather than achieve a settle-
ment. However, this changed during 
the course of the disturbance. Govern-
ment negotiators noted that the detain-
ees became increasingly punctual at 
negotiation sessions, sometimes even 
arriving early, which was taken as an 
indication that they had become in-
creasingly serious about them.16 
On the other hand, a similar cycle 
did not develop at Talladega. The 
Talladega detainees and the govern-
ment were as far, if not farther, apart 
at the end of the disturbance than at 
the start. Likewise, at Coxsackie in-
mates seemed more anxious and hos-
tile as the incident progressed. In 
cases like these, issuing an ultimatum 
may be in order when negotiations 
appear unproductive. 
Ultimatums 
When negotiations deadlock or are not 
taken seriously, commanders may 
decide to issue ultimatums. In prison 
riots they can be categorized as use-
of-force ultimatums and issues 
ultimatums. 
The use-of-force ultimatum. A use-
of-force ultimatum can be given in the 
expectation that inmates, given a clear 
choice between surrender and an 
armed assault, will choose surrender. 
In the riots studied, such ultimatums 
were issued at Camp Hill (the second 
riot) and at Kirkland and led to suc-
cessful resolutions. 
At Camp Hill, the State Police de-
clared over a public address system 
that inmates were to release their 
hostages, surrender by exiting the 
cellblocks, and lie face down on the 
yard. At Kirkland, the warden 
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announced over the public address 
system that the riot squad had been 
deployed, that it was instructed to use 
force if necessary, and that the in-
mates should lie face down on the 
ground. The warden used language 
that was simple, direct, and forceful. 
In both instances there were no retali-
ations against hostages, and the riots 
ended shortly thereafter. 
Issues related to the use-of-force ulti-
matum concern how to handle the 
transition from negotiation to force. 
Should government negotiators be 
alerted that an assault will occur? 
Many say no, because the negotiators 
might inadvertently reveal the plan. 
Others point to possible advantages: 
The negotiators might he able to dis-
tract the subject at the start of the as-
sault, provide reassurances that would 
lower his or her defenses, or position 
him or her for a sniper shotY None of, 
these advantages was foreseen by com-
manders at Talladega, and the Re-
gional Director elected not to inform 
the government negotiators of the 
planned tactical strike. 
What are the consequences if inmates 
refuse to surrender? At Kirkland and 
Camp Hill, use-of-force ultimatums 
were successful; in both instances riot 
squads were visible to inmates as they 
were deployed, a situation that may 
have contributed to the inmates' will-
ingness to choose surrender. But a 
use-of-force ultimatum should be is-
sued with every intention offollowing 
through. Otherwise, future ultimatums 
will have less credibility. 
The "issue" ultimatum. The principle 
behind issue ultimatums is that once 
inmates are told that some or all their 
demands will not be met, they will stop 
making these demands and focus on 1 
matters that can be negotiated. Police 
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"tegotiators generally discourage the 
use of this type of ultimatum and ad-
vise: "Never tell the subject 'no."'18 In-
stead, negotiators should try to recast 
demands so that they can be met or so 
they pose no immediate threat. 
This advice seems reasonable for 
prison riots. An exception was the 
situation observed at Atlanta. Over the 
course of 6 days, the detainees, Cuban 
nationals, demanded assurances that 
they could remain in the United 
States. Administrators were reluctant 
to tell the detainees that this issue was 
not negotiable because they feared 
they might retaliate against the hos-
tages. The detainees refused to drop 
the issue, however, and the negotia-
tions reached an impasse. Finally, a 
government negotiator told the inmates 
that their demand would not be met 
under any conditions. In this instance, 
a straightforward "no" broke the im-
passe without provoking retaliation 
against the hostages and allowed the 
negotiations to go forward. 
Waiting 
A third strategy for handling a prison 
disturbance is to wait it out, usually 
while maintaining a dialog. In law en-
Exhibit 1: Key Factors of Eight Prison Riots Studied 
Institution Duration Number of 
Hostages 
Kirkland 6 hours 22 
Correctional 
Institution 
U.S. Penitentiary, 11 days More than 1 00 
Atlanta, Georgia 
Mack Alford 3 days 8 
Correctional 
Center 
Coxsackie 14 hours 5 
Correctional 
Facility 
Idaho State 1 day None 
Correctional 
Institution 
Pennsylvania State 3 days First riot 8 
Correctional (two riots) Second riot 18 
Institution 
at Camp Hill 
Arizona State About 1 hour None 
Prison Complex 
(Cimarron Unit) 
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forcement, hostage negotiators often 
stall for time.19 The theory behind this 
strategy holds that hostage-takers tend 
to develop sympathy for their hostages, 
develop a rapport with police negotia-
tors, or just get tired of doing what 
they are doing. In light of this theory, 
police hostage teams are encouraged 
to avoid the temptation to "get it over 
with" but rather to patiently wait out 
the situation unless material threats to 
a hostage's safety or other consider-
ations force a reassessment of tactics. 
At Talladega continued waiting may 
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hostility among the detainees was be-
ginning to increase. Negotiations for-
mally ended the disturbance at Mack 
Alford, but in large measure the dis-
turbance succumbed to massive defec-
tion and inmate exhaustion. After 3 
days of rioting, only a fraction of the 
original participants remained on the 
yard. 
Although a waiting strategy may imply 
passivity on the part of the administra-
tion, usually the opposite is the case. 
Research on police hostage negotia-
tions,20 as well as negotiations in other 
contexts,21 emphasizes the importance 
of active listening: paying careful at-
tention to what is said, asking the 
speaker to clarify what she or he meant, 
and communicating to the speaker that 
she or he was understood. Active lis-
tening can be extraordinarily demand-
ing. The regional director in charge of 
Talladega's resolution reported that of-
ficials at the scene were continuously 
trying to discern what the detainees 
wanted and what they were trying to 
do, and to gather clues about their tac-
tical situation. 
A waiting strategy can employ tactics 
that will, by increasing inmates' dis-
comfort, directly motivate them to end 
the incident more quickly or create 
needs that prison administrators can 
then use to effect a bargain. At Atlanta 
helicopter overflights put pressure on 
inmates, and water and heat to the 
compound were cut off. At Talladega, 
food, which was in short supply to 
begin with, was denied. At Coxsackie 
and Mack Alford, the electricity was 
turned off. Each of these deprivations 
became negotiating points for the 
government. 
Hostages, however, have to endure the 
same deprivations as inmates. At 
Talladega detainees and hostages went 
10 days with very little food. Adminis-
trators were also concerned about a 
breakdown of order among hungry de-
tainees. In this situation, rather than 
follow the theory of "increasing situ-
ational stress if the subject is too com-
fortable," it seemed more prudent to 
follow the corollary of "decreasing 
stress if the subject is very anxious. "22 
Since the detainees at Talladega were 
showing signs of increasing tension and 
hostility toward the hostages, food was 
provided to ameliorate that situation, to 
lower the detainees' defenses, and, 
hopefully, get food to the hostages. 
After the riot 
A riot's aftermath consists of short-
term problems such as securing the 
prison, medium-term problems related 
to repairing the damage and returning 
staff to work, and long-term problems 
related to restoration and change. The 
specific short-term tasks should be in-
cluded in the riot plan. 
The short term 
After the inmates surrender, com-
manders must coordinate a search for 
contraband, move inmates to secure 
units, conduct damage assessments, 
and ensure that all inmates are ac-
counted for. Medical care must be pro-
vided to injured hostages and inmates. 
Evidence must be collected for future 
prosecutions. If outside staff or law en-
forcement personnel were requested, 
they must be released from duty as or-
der is restored. 
The importance of performing these 
tasks cannot be overstated. Having re-
solved the riot, the temptation to lower 
vigilance and assume that the worst is 
over may be premature. Therefore, riot 
plans should contain checklists and 
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guidelines for the immediate postriot 
period. 
After the first disturbance at Camp 
Hill, some of the essential post-riot 
tasks were not completed. The count 
was not cleared,23 and weapons and 
other debris were left in the hallways 
of blocks to which inmates were re-
turned. Although the locking mecha-
nisms of cell doors had been 
compromised, inmates were returned 
to them, and inmates were observed 
wandering outside their cells through-
out much of the night after the first 
riot. The institution's administrators 
were largely unaware of these prob-
lems because the information never 
reached them. In hindsight it seems 
that they should have gone to the 
blocks to assess the damage them-
selves instead of relying on the reports 
of others. Unaware of these problems, 
the superintendent at Camp Hill dis-
missed all but 25 of the 260 State Po-
lice officers who had been called to 
help quell the first disturbance. The 
25-officer contingent fell far short of 
the number needed to prevent the far 
more destructive riot that began the 
next day. 
In the other disturbances studied, 
these tasks were handled without ma-
jor problems. At Cimarron, a pressing 
issue in the immediate aftermath was 
the provision of medical care to the in-
mates who had been injured. One was 
evacuated by helicopter for emergency 
surgery, and 10 others were trans-
ported to hospitals by ambulance. The 
remainder of the inmates were 
searched and locked in their cells, and 
a count was taken. The inmates identi-
fied as being most active in the riot 
were placed in the facility's detention 
unit. The entire prison was searched 
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LOr weapons, but no buildup of weap-
ons was found. 
At Coxsackie the immediate aftermath 
of the incident was handled with an 
especially high level of control and, 
therefore, a greater certainty of results. 
Inmates not requiring immediate 
medical attention were moved to the 
gymnasium, separated from one an-
other by 20 feet of space, instructed 
not to talk, and supervised by one, and 
later two, correctional officers per in-
mate. Each inmate was examined by 
medical staff and then interviewed by 
the State Police, staff members from 
the department's Inspector General's 
Office, and staff members from the 
Commission of Correction. Five hours 
after the riot's resolution, they were 
transferred in small numbers to other 
facilities. 
· mmediate postriot tasks at Atlanta 
mainly involved transferring the de-
tainees to other facilities. Over a 24-
hour period, they were escorted out of 
the compound one at a time. BOP staff 
searched detainees with the aid of a 
fluoroscope, placed them in restraints, 
and put them on a bus for transfer to 
another facility. 
One of the immediate responsibilities 
of the governing agency is to help em-
ployees overcome the short- and long-
term traumas of the disturbance. 
Mental health professionals may play a 
crucial role in debriefing staff after 
disturbances.24 In general, prison ad-
ministrators and officers interviewed 
for this study stated that such debrief-
ing sessions were useful. In some de-
partments, such as South Carolina's, 
they are mandatory. At Coxsackie each 
of the released hostages was accompa-
nied by a mental health professional 
,md a close friend during initial medi-
cal treatment and debriefing. 
The medium term 
In the medium term, prison adminis-
trators must provide continued support 
to employees in coping with their ex-
perience, repair the damage done to 
the facility, work toward normalization 
of institutional operations, and under-
take the administrative followup asso-
ciated with a disturbance. 
Public recognition of the sacrifices 
made by hostages, as well as an ex-
pression of appreciation for the exem-
plary action of staff during the riot, 
may be important in reintegrating the 
corrections community. Following 
Talladega, for example, the Acting At-
torney General commented that he felt 
"grateful beyond words and proud be-
yond measure." This recognition can 
also be made at public ceremonies 
such as one held by the Oklahoma 
State Legislature. Ongoing counseling 
and support for former hostages may 
be necessary as well. 
Damage to the structural integrity of 
the facility must be addressed. At Cox-
sackie the inmates destroyed the con-
trol center of the SHU so they could 
not immediately be returned to their 
cells. The inmates at Idaho knocked 
holes between cells, rendering many 
of them unusable. In the largest, most 
destructive riots, such as those at 
Atlanta and Camp Hill, major recon-
struction was needed. 
During the medium term, a report may 
be commissioned to find out why the 
incident occurred. The report may 
help corrections officials, policymak-
ers, and the public understand what 
the riot was about, thereby helping to 
establish a long-term reform agenda. It 
may help answer the question of 
whether systemwide changes are 
needed or only minor policy adjust-
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ments. Official inquiries into the eight 
riots under study varied in several 
ways, discussed in the following 
sections. 
Issuing agency. At Camp Hill the Gov-
ernor commissioned a blue-ribbon 
panel to investigate the disturbance, 
and two legislative committees each 
wrote independent reports. Following 
the Cimarron incident, the Director of 
Corrections requested that another 
State agency, the Department of Public 
Safety, conduct the investigation to en-
sure objectivity, in light of the fact that 
there had been racial tensions at the 
unit. The investigations of the ISCI 
and Mack Alford riots were conducted 
by members of the respective States' 
central offices. At Coxsackie, the New 
York State Commission of Corrections 
(the body responsible for monitoring 
all correctional facilities in New York) 
conducted the investigation (its staff 
had been on the scene soon after the 
riot started). In response to both the 
Atlanta and the Talladega riots, the 
BOP established teams consisting pri-
marily of senior staff and representa-
tives from the other Federal agencies 
involved in the riot's resolution. 
Scope of the investigation. The re-
ports on the Camp Hill disturbance 
were the most far reaching, raising is-
sues about the riot's management and 
related concerns such as prison crowd-
ing and alternatives to incarceration. 
The reports at Coxsackie, Mack 
Alford, and ISCI focused primarily on 
the riots themselves rather than any 
far-reaching implications. The authors 
of the reports on Atlanta, and to a 
lesser extent Talladega, used the op-
portunity to rethink the BOP's entire 
emergency preparedness effort. At 
Cimarron the focus was primarily on 
whether the use of force was justified 
and complied with department policy. 
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Audience. The results of the investiga-
tions at Cimarron, ISCI, and Mack 
Alford were intended primarily for use 
by those in the central offices of the 
State agencies. The reports on Cox-
sackie, the two Federal prison distur-
bances, Atlanta and Talladega, and 
Camp Hill were written for those 
within the agency, policymakers con-
cerned with corrections, and to some 
degree, the general corrections 
community. 
Long-term solutions 
A prison riot, by definition, means loss 
of control by prison administrators. 
Once they are resolved, prison riots 
can provide an opportunity for correc-
tional leaders to develop policy that 
reflects what they have learned, pro-
vided they listen carefully and think 
clearly about the events. A corrections 
department can become stronger, less 
likely to lose control, and more effec-
tive in resolving disturbances when a 
prison riot is followed by one or more 
of the following outcomes. 
Gains are made in the ability to fore-
cast a disturbance, and the flow of in-
formation is improved. Corrections 
officials, having experienced a distur-
bance, may be more aware of and bet-
ter able to interpret future warning 
signs. 
Previously unrecognized problems 
are remedied. Riots may reveal weak-
nesses in facilities, operating proce-
dures, or organization. It is better to 
ask how the problems can be resolved 
than argue about whether certain ac-
tions contributed to the riot. 
The outcome of innovations made 
during the disturbance are reviewed 
and incorporated into riot plans. Dur-
ing the Atlanta disturbance, for ex-
ample, the BOP developed the idea of 
setting up a center for the hostages' 
families-a place where they could 
obtain information and support. Its 
success led the Bureau to make this a 
standard feature of its response. 
Relationships with other agencies are 
improved. During a riot new relation-
ships among agencies may emerge or 
the need for them may be demon-
strated, as at Camp Hill. After a dis-
turbance, gains should be consolidated 
and relationships strengthened. 
Innovations are made in the recon-
struction process. The postriot period 
can be used to restore what existed be-
fore the disturbance or to depart from 
tradition. For example, after the Mack 
Alford disturbance, the employees, in-
cluding correction officers, case man-
agers, and maintenance workers, 
became involved in developing plans 
to reconstruct the prison. A delegation 
was sent to several prisons in another 
State to develop ideas about architec-
tural design. This break with tradition 
(previous architectural planning had 
been conducted only in the central of-
fice) helped create a sense of owner-
ship among Mack Alford staff. 
Morale is addressed. A riot is unlikely 
to leave employees' morale untouched. 
Much depends on what happened dur-
ing the riot and the outcome. If the 
resolution went well, if employees per-
ceived that corrections management 
faced the crisis squarely and with 
adequate resources and preparation, 
and if the responses of the political 
community and media were positive, 
then the disturbance may actually en-
hance the prison staffs sense of mis-
sion, loyalty, and confidence in their 
agency. Where these factors are ab-
sent, morale may plummet. 
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Camp Hill provides an example of 
some serious problems facing correc-
tions administrators in a prison riot's 
wake, but also shows how such chal-
lenges can be met. A new commis-
sioner of corrections and a new 
superintendent were hired. The com-
missioner reorganized the central of-
fice, secured a grant from the National 
Institute of Corrections to revamp the 
department's system for emergency 
preparedness, and improved relation-
ships with other State agencies in-
volved in emergency planning. The 
new superintendent helped direct the 
rebuilding of the facility. 
Conclusion 
The eight riots in this study are obvi-
ously not representative of every 
prison disturbance. The unique char-
acteristics of each institution, its staff, 
administration, and inmate popula- 1 
tions, as well as the State or Federal 
agency to which it belongs, shape the 
precipitating conditions, resolution, 
and aftermath of a riot. Comprehensive 
planning based on awareness of other 
incidents and lessons learned from the 
past cannot prevent all prison riots. It 
can, however, help correctional admin-
istrators avoid some disturbances, take 
action to prevent the small incident 
from expanding into a full-scale riot, 
limit the extent of damage of riots in 
progress, and terminate riot situations 
in the least costly way. 
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